INTRODUCTION
Are we nearing the end of oil? Some prognosticators have warned that the world production of oil, the lifeblood of modern civilization, is reaching or has reached a peak, to be followed by inexorable decline. Prophecies of fossil fuel scarcity have led to predictions that we are approaching a peak in overall material consumption. Food and fresh water shortages, climate instability, and unsustainable patterns of extraction and urbanization combine to offer a grim future of converging and intensifying global crises. According to several selfstyled collapsitarians, the world now faces a century of declines, the long emergency, environmental collapse, or peak everything. 1 Peak oil, the concept that underpins most other notions of peak and collapse, is often referred to as Hubbert's Peak, after the Shell Oil geophysicist, M. King Hubbert, who in 1956 famously forecast the peak in U.S. oil production. Critics in both industry and government attacked Hubbert's Peak for the next fifteen years, citing the erroneous warnings of oil shortages by earlier forecasters. As the United States grew increasingly dependent on oil, estimating the future domestic supply of this precious resource became a more serious and contested endeavor, with major implications for policymaking. When U.S. crude oil production in the lower forty-eight states did in fact peak in late 1970 and start to decline steadily, year after year, Hubbert became known as ''the oil prophet. '' 2 The apparent confirmation of Hubbert's Peak during the middle of the 1970s energy crisis helped reframe the national dialogue on petroleum issues. It convincingly questioned the long-standing ideology of American abundance. Hubbert's thesis suggested that Americans were no longer the people of plenty, no longer the masters of nature. The peaking of oil production even foretold Both sides in recent debates over peak oil make appeals to history, but rarely does anyone bother to revisit the original controversy over Hubbert's Peak. For those who follow oil and energy, Hubbert is a household name. Few people, however, have ever heard of his chief adversary, Vincent McKelvey, a longtime research geologist at the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) who in 1971 rose to become the director of that agency. McKelvey embraced an expansive interpretation of U.S. petroleum resources, and he repeatedly suppressed the peak oil forecasts of King Hubbert, who moved to the USGS in 1964 after retiring from Shell. For the next ten years, McKelvey and Hubbert argued bitterly with each other over the extent of American petroleum reserves. By the mid-1970s, Hubbert's theory appeared to be confirmed, paving the way for later predictions about global peak oil. McKelvey was fired as USGS director for his reckless optimism about U.S. oil potential, and his name faded into obscurity. But the recent and spectacular reversal of the decline in U.S. oil production along with major new discoveries around the world has challenged many peak oil prophecies, including Hubbert's most famous one. Vincent McKelvey may yet have the last laugh.
The great debate over peak oil reveals the dilemmas faced by policymakers in managing the boundaries between science and politics as the subject of energy moved to the forefront of national policymaking. Both Hubbert and McKelvey possessed strong personalities characterized by arrogance and insecurity. Their disagreement was ostensibly a scientific one, but it was also ideological and personal. In estimating the extent of undiscovered oil reserves, an inexact and speculative practice, they hardened their positions over time. Hubbert's emphasis on geological depletion as a mechanism for creating scarcity clashed irreconcilably with McKelvey's focus on price and technology as the keys to manufacturing plenty.
Prefiguring other polarizing environmental debates that emerged in the 1970s, Hubbert and McKelvey offered opposing narratives about the sources and sustainability of American material abundance. 6 Their confrontation demonstrated the tension in postwar futurology between a conception of the future as ''an object of science in which certain traces could be found'' (Hubbert) and one that was ''an object of the human imagination, creativity, and will'' (McKelvey). 7 Hubbert's discovery of a predictable trend in oil production and consumption increasingly influenced discourses about the fate of society, and it even created a cultural movement of prophecy believers who anxiously anticipated the end of oil.
8 Although Hubbert's influence in the profession of resource estimation has waned, and notions of resource cornucopia are once again in ascendance in the United States, Hubbert's Peak still haunts any consideration of humanity's environmental future.
EARLY PROPHECIES
During the twentieth century, scientists were increasingly called on to make predictions-about weather, earthquakes, floods, resource availability, and climate change-in order to assist forward-looking decision making. The job of estimating and forecasting American petroleum resources fell upon the USGS. Established in 1879 during the era of westward expansion, the USGS assumed responsibility for the ''classification of the public lands, and examination of the geological structure, mineral resources, and products of the national domain. '' 9 By the turn of the century, this mandate included evaluating water and coal resources and estimating the nation's petroleum resources and reserves. 10. The distinction between resources and reserves has become critical to petroleum appraisal. The term resource encompasses all naturally occurring concentrations of hydrocarbons in the earth's crust, whereas reserves refer to that part of the resource base that has been demonstrated to be recoverable under normal economic conditions and existing technology. In the reserves category, distinctions are made between possible, probable, and proved. Distinctions also are made between conventional petroleum (crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids from commonly exploited reservoirs) and unconventional petroleum (continuous-type formations such as shale, Early USGS petroleum resource assessments, as well as those made by other geologists, were based on an evolving but quite underdeveloped understanding of petroleum geology. Predictions consistently underestimated the extent of proven and undiscovered oil resources. In 1884, the USGS noted in its annual report that ''it is possible that the wells in some districts (in Pennsylvania) may so completely give out that the whole district may be abandoned. '' 11 As production fell in Pennsylvania, but not nearly as quickly as the USGS had projected, Standard Oil executive John D. Archbold confronted the possibility of oil finds in Oklahoma with the remark: ''Are you crazy? Why I'll drink every gallon west of the Mississippi. '' 12 As Naomi Oreskes explains, earth science was not historically a predictive science, like astronomy, physics, or chemistry. Geology had advanced through inductive generalizations about observational evidence. During the nineteenth century, intensive mapping had led to significant theoretical insights. Still, geologists were concerned with explaining the unknown and the earth's past as it unfolded over millions of years, not predicting a future that was unknowable, especially in geologic time. For decades, resource assessment was the work of consulting geologists who did not benefit from substantial institutional backing or sophisticated methodology.
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That is not to say their forecasts went unheeded or that their geological expertise was discounted. In 1909, Dr. David Day of the USGS published the first major assessment of U.S. petroleum reserves. Using a rudimentary ''volumetric'' method, Day examined past production of known fields and reduced their numbers to barrels per acre. Making assumptions about average geological characteristics (porosity, yield per cubic foot, reservoir thickness, rate of -heavy oil deposits, and oil sands). Almost all petroleum resource appraisals until the 1980s focused exclusively on estimating conventional reserves. recovery) and average barrel per acre yield, Day estimated a total proved reserve of between 10 billion and 24.5 billion barrels, pointing to the middle range of 15 billion barrels as the most probable figure. Assuming constantly increasing production, the oil industry would exhaust national reserves by 1935.
Department of the
14 World War I increased the importance of estimating U.S. petroleum reserves. In 1916, the USGS created an Oil and Gas Section. During the war, the section's geologists developed standard methods, such as depletion curves, for assessing the amount of oil available in established fields. This helped both in planning the war effort and in determining oil company taxes on production. However, estimating the size of undiscovered oil deposits, especially before the introduction of seismic methods in the mid-1920s, was mostly a crapshoot. Estimates were later confirmed as exceedingly low. In 1919, David White, USGS chief geologist and head of the Oil and Gas Section, warned that American petroleum reserves of 6.74 billion would only be enough to last another seventeen or eighteen years at current rates of consumption. He also predicted that U.S. oil production would peak in three to five years. USGS director, George Otis Smith, used this forecast to lobby U.S. foreign policymakers to secure petroleum overseas so that it could be conserved at home. In 1921, the USGS joined forces with the newly founded American Association of Petroleum Geologists (AAPG) to place the nation's petroleum resources at 9.15 billion barrels. That was larger than the Survey's 1919 estimate because it included new production from California fields, but it was still pessimistic about future supply. A multitude of oil discoveries along the Gulf Coast, in the Mid-Continent, and in California during the 1920s led to a supply glut by the early 1930s that erased worries about impending shortages. Fears of oil famine had led the federal government to offer multiple incentives for oil exploration and production, with dramatic results. 16 At the same time, the American Petroleum Institute (API), the industry trade organization created in 1919, employed modern public relations and lobbying to counter conservationist proposals. The API used similar data as the USGS-AAPG, but disseminated it in a way to support highly optimistic claims for U.S. oil potential. For the next several decades, abundance, not scarcity, would dominate discourse and policymaking on natural resources in the United States.
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ASSURANCES OF ABUNDANCE
In the 1930s, scholars began to offer new conceptions of an inexhaustible resource, providing the foundational arguments for assertions of resource abundance. In response to proposals for restricting the depletion of finite resources, economists began to theorize and calculate the optimal rate of depletion. In 1931, Harold Hotelling, a Columbia University statistician and economic theorist, published a landmark paper, ''The Economics of Exhaustible Resources,'' which argues, in effect, that market forces will conserve resources by raising prices, reducing demand, and thus slowing depletion. Although Hotelling's Rule did not become a staple of neoclassical economics until the 1960s, it pioneered a market-based, economic interpretation of nonrenewable resources, which argued that they would not necessarily be produced and consumed wastefully. 16. In 1913, Congress passed tax breaks for wildcat drilling that by the mid-1920s evolved into a depletion allowance giving a 27.5% tax deduction on production and provisions that allowed for the expensing of intangible drilling costs against current income. In 1920, Congress also passed the Mineral Leasing Act, which reopened federal lands to private petroleum producers. Hotelling's Rule formally states that the price of an exhaustible resource must grow at a rate equal to the rate of interest, both along an efficient extraction path and in A lesser-known contemporary of Hotelling's, Erich Zimmermann from the University of Texas, became the first modern economist to challenge the idea of natural resources as something fixed in nature. Zimmermann insisted that human society created, altered, and depleted natural resources. Their supply changed with evolving technologies, markets, and political institutions. ''Resources are not, they become,'' wrote Zimmermann in his 1933 study, World Resources and Industries (emphasis in original). ''They evolve out of the triune interaction of nature, man, and culture, in which nature sets outer limits, but man and culture are largely responsible for the portion of physical totality that is made available for human use. '' 19 A new generation of economists and economic geologists would take the implications of Zimmerman's analysis further and declare that no resource was depletable.
20 By the 1950s, the dominant discourse asserted that Americans, for better or worse, produced plenty. They did not deplete the nation's resources. The book that captured the spirit of the age was historian David Potter's People of Plenty (1954) . Potter argued that American abundance resulted not from natural endowment or luck, but from ''human resourcefulness.'' Physical abundance had initially produced a high degree of social, economic, and political dynamism in the United States, giving Americans an exceptional capacity to exploit natural resources and regenerate abundance.
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For U.S. social scientists in the postwar period, the dilemma for American society was not alleviating scarcity, but, as Martin Melosi describes it, ''coping with abundance.'' With such a wide set of energy choices, argues Melosi, Americans, prior to the 1970s, had never been able to develop a workable national energy strategy. 22 problems arising from bountiful resources and production. John Kenneth Galbraith criticized the ''affluent society'' for failing to achieve an adequate distribution of its abundance, and Robert Theobald, in The Challenge of Abundance (1962) , feared the enervating effects of that abundance on American social and economic values. 23 But, for David Potter and others, abundance was cause for celebrating American innovation, technology supremacy, and market-driven growth, which rendered obsolete the paradigm of scarcity.
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Faith in abundance colored domestic oil supply assessments as well as larger notions of American exceptionalism and national superiority. As early as 1952, the Independent Petroleum Association of America (IPAA) declared a new age of abundant oil wealth. Seeking to ensure that public policy did not encourage the development of Middle Eastern oil resources at the expense of the domestic industry, the IPAA nevertheless was sincere in its optimistic assessment. Previous reserve estimates had been surpassed easily, technologies were improving, the rate of discovery exceeded the rate of depletion, and production capacity was greater than actual production. 25 Likewise, the National Petroleum Council (NPC), the oil and gas industry advisory body established in 1945 by President Harry Truman, consistently pinned its advice on the assumption that appropriate price signals would always call forth new resources and ensure adequate supplies, and it refused even to project supply trends into the distant future. 
HUBBERT'S PREDICTION
This was the climate of opinion that the talented and headstrong geophysicist, Marion King Hubbert (Fig. 1) , first waded into in 1956 and battled for years thereafter. A native of San Saba, Texas, he received BS and MS degrees from the University of Chicago in the 1920s and his PhD in geology and geophysics from the same university in 1937. In the late 1930s, while teaching at Columbia University, Hubbert helped found an organization called Technocracy, Incorporated. Evolving out of a Progressive Era emphasis on efficiency and expertise, and influenced by the iconoclastic ideas of Thorstein Veblen, Technocracy spearheaded a social movement to bring about a new kind of industrial society governed by scientists and engineers who would use their technical expertise to manage the economy. The ill-fated and controversial mission of Technocracy, Inc. was to seek, in Hubbert's words, a ''social structure whose fundamentals were energy and mineral resources, and whose accounting system was based on physical relations, thermodynamics and so on, rather than a monetary system. '' 29 Although technocracy faded rather quickly as a social movement, Hubbert remained a technocrat all his life, believing that most of society's problems were not understood or effectively addressed by the vast majority of people, whether they be businessmen, politicians, or, especially, economists.
Hubbert had no tolerance for the modern economist's subjective definition of natural resources and obsession with growth. The quest for perpetual growth-''the sacred cow in the economists' language''-and unchecked consumption both disguised and endangered the link between the human species and the ''basic properties of matter and energy.'' 30 The earth, in Hubbert's view, was a material system with a finite amount of energy. He insisted that there were hard physical limits to human population growth and per capita energy consumption. 
31.
A story related by Martha Lou Broussard, Hubbert's former technical assistant at Shell Oil, illuminates his conviction. In her job interview, Hubbert asked Broussard if she had children or if she intended on having children. He believed the world was overpopulated; he and his wife had elected not to have children. He then had her stand at a blackboard and write out math problems, one of which was to calculate, given the current rate of population increase, when the earth's population density would reach one person per square meter. Martha Lou Broussard interview by author, Houston, TX, 17 Apr 2009.
By almost every account of anyone who knew or worked with him, Hubbert was rude, boastful, and belligerent. 32 But he was a brilliant scientist. Famous for his later studies of petroleum reserves, Hubbert's earlier scientific achievements actually were more substantial. By the early 1950s, he already had become a giant in the world of petroleum geology and geophysics. He had resolved a long-standing paradox regarding the plastic flow of hard rocks in the earth's crust, revised theories about the movement of underground fluids, and revolutionized thinking about petroleum entrapment. 33 The weight of his work came from demonstrating new mathematical approaches to problems. His talent and achievements had earned him a mandate to do open-ended geophysical research at Shell Oil, and his reputation made people listen to him.
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After the war, during a brief period of concern about resource supplies in the corridors of Washington, Hubbert brought his mathematical prowess to bear on oil and gas reserve estimates. He began researching this subject in 1948, the year the United States became a net importer of oil for the first time in the nation's history. In a presentation at the American Association for the Advancement of Science's centennial celebration, Hubbert emphasized the unsustainable rate of increase in the consumption of fossil fuels and pointed out ''that the production curve of any given species of fossil fuel will rise, pass through one or several maxima, and then decline asymptotically to zero.'' Having identified the tensions between fossil fuel consumption and supply, he set about finding a quantitative way to express this relationship.
Hubbert presented his initial finding at a 1956 API meeting in San Antonio. Invited to present a ''broad brush picture of the overall world energy situation,'' he began his paper, ''Nuclear Energy and Fossil Fuels,'' by plotting logistic curves of oil and gas production for Texas, the United States, and the world. Drawing on the work of economic geologist D. F. Hewett on the life cycles of mining districts, he wrote a paper that treated the issue of oil and gas depletion quantitatively as a function of cumulative production. His calculations actually were quite simple. He plotted the rate production on the y-axis and time on the x-axis (Fig. 2) . Annual production rose from zero at the beginning of the oil age, curved into a peak, and then trended toward zero as ultimate reserves were exhausted. 36 Hubbert drew the bell-curve graph so sharply on both sides, depicting the rise and fall of the oil age as merely a blip in time, that for many years it was called Hubbert's Pimple rather than Hubbert's Peak. Hubbert did not venture an independent estimate of ultimate volumes (discovered plus to-be-discovered) in his graph. Rather, he borrowed estimates from industry experts, who approached reserves during this period with restrained optimism, in contrast to the exuberant optimism of academic economists. 38 To calculate ultimate reserves, these industry officials, as well as the USGS, used variations on volumetric yield analysis, which extrapolated average per unit oil-production yields from explored basins to less-explored but geologically similar areas. This method involved a high degree of subjectivity in determining volumes and geological similarity. It assumed similar recovery of oil per unit volume of sediment, but without empirical evidence to support such an assumption. Still, in the mid-1950s, it was as reliable as any other method. 39 At the time, it was reliable enough for Hubbert. Based on the industry estimates, Hubbert drew two curves, one assuming an ultimate reserve of 150 billion barrels, and one assuming 200 billion barrels, the difference covering the realm of uncertainty.
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Hubbert was chiefly interested in determining the moment of peak production, a concept not previously addressed in petroleum resource assessment. He argued that the peak occurs when half of the oil has been produced, or about 75-100 billion barrels if 150-200 billion barrels are used as the ultimate reserve. Assuming increasing consumption, Hubbert regarded peak production as the critical event in the life cycle of an extracted resource; the peak would inevitably force a fundamental readjustment in production and consumption trends. In the 1956 paper, Hubbert's graph projected the U.S. crude oil peak to occur sometime between 1965 and 1970 (see Fig. 2 ). Given the limits on future oil supply, the second half of the paper dwelt on how nuclear energy offered the best hope ''for our needs for at least the next few centuries of 'the foreseeable future.''' What was so shocking about Hubbert's projection was that it offered a unique and intuitive interpretation of widely published data that overturned conventional wisdom. That wisdom held that petroleum resources were plentiful, not poised for decline. Hubbert often told the story of being called off the platform a few minutes before giving his address by a Shell Oil public relations executive in New York. He remembered the executive pleading: ''Couldn't you tone it down a bit? Couldn't you take the sensational parts out? '' 42 Hubbert's Peak threatened the U.S. oil industry in several ways. First, by suggesting that the United States did not have as much oil as assumed, it could make investors and creditors question the future viability of domestic oil and consequently raise the cost of capital. Second, a pessimistic outlook for domestic oil would also undercut the campaign by the domestic-based, independent oil companies for protection from Middle Eastern imports. Other government benefits, such as oil tax breaks, subsidies, and access to public lands, might also be jeopardized if long-term prospects for the industry appeared uncertain. Finally, Hubbert questioned the deeply imbued psychology of abundance that permeated the industry and American society.
The aftershock of his prediction reverberated through the industry for years. Although some oilmen privately respected the new insight Hubbert brought to the subject, public reaction by many in the industry denounced Hubbert's thesis and rejected any restraint on optimism. 43 Morgan Davis, who would become president and chairman of Humble Oil in 1957, together with his chief economic advisor, Richard Gonzalez, who shaped oil policy recommendations at the National Petroleum Council, led the charge against Hubbert. Their initial tactic was to assert that the ultimate reserve estimates he cited were far too conservative. Improved production techniques and additional discoveries would move ultimate reserves higher. 44 They then disputed the idea that the declining rate of discoveries inevitably would be followed by a declining rate of production. There was no necessary correlation; the magnitude of discoveries was bound to increase, justifying larger estimates of ultimate production and pushing the production peak beyond worry far into the future. Hubbert warmed to the attention he received as an oil company researcher in a public debate with the president of a major American oil company. During the next several years, he further developed his thesis. As he himself recognized, the weakness of his 1956 curve was that it relied on an exogenous estimate of unknown quality for the ultimate amount of oil to be produced. Setting out to develop his own estimate, he began analyzing the statistics on annual oil production and proven reserves. In papers given at the University of Texas in 1958 and at the AAPG annual meeting in Dallas in 1959, he theorized that the curve indicating a peak in crude oil production would be an asymptote of the curve describing the peak in the growth of crude oil reserves. In other words, as Hubbert described it, ''I pointed out that when the reserves peaked, that was a clue of how close you were to the peak of production. '' 46 In the late 1950s, Hubbert's views had no effect on official oil supply forecasts. Those years witnessed a giant leap in U.S. crude oil reserve estimates, although not because of any immediate new finds or improvements in technology. They were theoretical increases, unsupported by any new data. In 1956, the Department of the Interior issued a new estimate of 300 billion barrels, without attribution or revelation of the methods used to arrive at the estimate. 47 A 1958 study by the Washington think-tank, Resources for the Future, surveyed the new estimates and concluded, ''the total crude oil awaiting (potentially available for) future recovery in the United States can be inferred from expert opinion to be on the order of 500 billion barrels.'' subcommittee on energy. 49 Bronk ordered the USGS to work with Hubbert's committee on producing the final report. Vincent McKelvey, a career USGS geologist who had just risen to the position of assistant chief geologist, took responsibility for compiling and coordinating the Survey's data for the subcommittee. Hubbert and McKelvey were two headstrong men who came at the problem of estimating U.S. petroleum reserves from completely different directions. Their disagreement over the future of domestic production, beginning with this study, would shape petroleum assessment at the USGS and in wider circles for the next fifteen years.
In January 1962, McKelvey hand-delivered to Hubbert a thick report that included a preprint of a new official USGS estimate of ultimate U.S. crude oil resources, based on research by a USGS staff geologist, Alfred D. Zapp. Reportedly frustrated by earlier USGS estimates that were too conservative, Zapp looked for a way to improve the volumetric yield method of extrapolating from proved reserves. By 1961, the industry had drilled a cumulative 1.1 billion feet and discovered 130 billion barrels of crude oil in 20 percent of the nation's sedimentary rock. Thus, an average of 118 barrels were discovered per foot of exploratory drilling. Assuming a similar rate of discovery in the nation's other 80 percent of sedimentary rock, Zapp's preprint estimated that at least an additional 170 billion barrels, under static economic and technological conditions, could be discovered with an additional 2 billion feet of exploratory drilling.
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Hubbert objected to what he considered an inflated ultimate estimate of 300 billion barrels of ultimate reserves (130 billion discovered plus 170 billion to be discovered). When he voiced this complaint to McKelvey, the response he received was that the ultimate should be 590 billion barrels, not 300 billion. An additional 290 billion would be added under the classification, submarginal resources. This was based on an optimistic discovery rate estimate of 145 barrels per foot through an additional 2 billion feet of drilling. Even 590 billion barrels, 49 . The NAS-NRC study was organized into seven separate subcommittees: renewable resources, water resources, mineral resources, energy resources, marine resources, environmental resources, and social and economic aspects of natural resources. McKelvey told a dumbfounded Hubbert, was conservative. The so-called Zapp hypothesis assumed an average rate of return per well for known discoveries and then applied this rate to deeper wells in existing and potential petroleum-bearing basins, arriving at the figure of 590 billion barrels from a total 5 billion feet of exploratory drilling. 51 Science magazine later described the technique as ''requiring nothing more sophisticated than a geologic map of the country and an adding machine. '' 52 ''The magnitude of 590 billion barrels was just jolting!'' Hubbert recalled. 53 In response, he informed McKelvey, USGS Director Tom Nolan, and everyone else associated with the NAS-NRC study that he could not accept that estimate in his subcommittee report. He was going to produce his own estimate, and if the other members of the committee did not like it, he would resign from the committee and publish it somewhere else. Hubbert was convinced that discoveries were not made at a constant rate per foot of drilling, but he did not yet have the time or the data to disprove this assumption [he would later, see below]. The committee grudgingly went along with him.
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In his report, Hubbert offered a new method for estimating ultimate U.S. crude-oil production that used the most reliable series of statistics on cumulative production, proved reserves, and cumulative proved discoveries (the sum of the first two). He then fitted those statistics to the theoretical curve he described in 1956. From his curves, he concluded that cumulative proved discoveries peaked in 1957, proved reserves would peak about 1962, and that the production peak would occur in the late 1960s. Given this information, applying his theory about the asymptotic relationship between production and reserves, and assuming that cumulative production before the point of inflection on the theoretical curve would equal one-half the ultimate production, Hubbert calculated ultimate production in the continental United States and near-adjacent offshore areas to be 175 billion barrels. The USGS director, Tom Nolan, feebly explained that the estimates cited in the Oil and Gas Journal did not come from an official Geological Survey report, and that a range of figures was warranted. But Nolan's statements only obfuscated matters, since the positions of Hubbert and McKelvey were simply incompatible.
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HUBBERT'S TRIUMPH
Once the voice of resource pessimism and conservation, the USGS became the leading disseminator of what could be called the discourse of market-driven abundance. It is tempting to argue that the USGS in the 1930s and 1940s had become captive to the interests of mineral industries and oil-state representatives in Congress, and thus prone to making favorable assessments of the ability of markets and technology to extend domestic mineral resources. But on closer inspection, it appears that the USGS actually had become more removed from the influence of the oil business.
The USGS's optimism did not differ superficially from that expressed by many oilmen. The Survey was insulated, however, from changing views on resource appraisal that spread through the industry in the 1960s. Leadership in the USGS always came from the Geologic Division, an elite unit of academic geologists with expertise in hard-rock geology and little experience with modern petroleum. 60 As many in the industry began to arrive at more sober assessments of supply increasingly in line with Hubbert's, the USGS continued to ''gush higher. '' 61 This was due almost entirely to the influence of Vincent McKelvey (Fig. 3 ). An expert in phosphates with advanced degrees from the University of phosphates and led the USGS's uranium geology program for the Atomic Energy Commission. He had no background in oil and gas geology, but that did not stop him from launching an assault on Hubbert's oil supply projections. One associate described him as ''so bright, he always knew so mucha hard driver, sometimes arrogant. '' 62 In 1963, while he was battling Hubbert, McKelvey received the Distinguished Service Award, the Department of the Interior's highest. In 1965, he became a senior research geologist, advancing to chief geologist briefly before becoming the Survey's director in 1971.
McKelvey aspired to be more than a research geologist. He wanted to be known as a man of vast knowledge, pursuits, and authority. During the USGS's new age (1956-65), Director Tom Nolan encouraged his geologists to ''expand their fields of interest from individual problems and 'participate actively and authoritatively in the matters affecting the whole country.''' 63 As he ascended the administrative ranks of the Survey, McKelvey took growing interest in the broader aspects of mineral resources first aroused by his Wisconsin mentor, Charles (C. K.) Leith, a world-famous geologist and advisor to several U.S. presidents on strategic minerals issues. 64 Often sporting a bowtie, McKelvey fashioned himself as a public intellectual who could offer incisive commentary on the big questions of the day, the most important of which, for him, had to do with the foundations of material prosperity in human society. He was an unabashed Cornucopian. He made it his mission to place an optimistic spin on the Survey's resource estimates, and he made sure to surround himself with loyal lieutenants who would tow the line.
65
He first joined the public conversation on resource supply in the late 1950s, when American assurances of abundance were becoming bolder. In an article for Science magazine in 1959, McKelvey attempted to dispel concerns about the explosion in world population by pointing to the almost unlimited human potential to alleviate food and resource constraints. Venturing far from his expertise as a phosphate geologist, McKelvey tried to develop a grand theory about how and why humans had been able to overcome subsistence crises. The result combined culturally chauvinistic views on population control with facile observations on history and anthropology. The increasing consumption of raw materials and energy should not be cause for alarm, he argued, because such increases were associated historically with the growing ability of Western societies to extend their control over the physical environment and thus increase their means of subsistence. ''Resources of usable raw materials and energy may be increased to an unpredictable extent by the development and application of ingenuity,'' wrote McKelvey. Rather than fretting about abundance, like Galbraith or Theobald, McKelvey celebrated it as the product and handmaiden of innovation. In an unpublished manuscript entitled ''Cornerstones of Affluence,'' he argued that mineral fuels, metals, nonmetals, and water formed ''the basis of the affluent industrial society.'' If these resources were the cornerstones, then the structure and pillars of affluence were ''human purpose, effort, and advanced technological, socioeconomic, and political ingenuity that converts worthless sand and clay into useful products.'' Citing Erich Zimmermann, he asserted that the usability of resources, rather than their mere existence, is what makes them valuable. 67 For McKelvey and other apostles of abundance, resources were more important as ideas rather than as concrete objects of nature. ''The process by which we create resources,'' wrote McKelvey in an article adapted from his ''Cornerstones'' manuscript, ''have dimensions beyond our knowledge and even beyond our imagination at any given time. '' 68 This imagination colored McKelvey's, and thus the USGS's, petroleum supply estimates from the early 1960s into the mid-1970s. Resource appraisal needed to incorporate economic and technological factors, which Hubbert often resisted. But the way the government scientists blended these factors into their estimations, as Hubbert pointed out, imposed almost no limit on the size of reserves that could be imagined.
The chapter at the heart of McKelvey's manuscript is called ''Meaning and Preparation of Reserve and Resource Estimates,'' which was eventually published in the 1972 issue of American Scientist. In this piece, McKelvey offers a simplistic mathematical equation to illustrate the ''essential role of mineral and mineral fuels in human life'': L ¼ R x E x I / P, where ''L'' is a society's average ''level of living,'' ''R'' is raw materials, ''E'' is energy, ''I'' is all forms of ingenuity, and ''P'' is the population that shares in the product. Hubbert blasted this formula as lacking ''any understanding of the incompatibility of the quantities dealt with,'' and having only ''the appearance of conveying meaning without actually doing so. ' 70 most were still uncomfortable with the way he extrapolated past trends into the future. ''Exercises . . . based on statistics without regard for the controlling fundamentals,'' grumbled Lewis Weeks, one of the more respected appraisers of petroleum resources, ''should not be dignified as estimates of resources.'' John Ryan, an economist for Standard Oil of New Jersey (Exxon), added that Hubbert's analysis ignored the role of economics in determining the size of reserves, and he pointed out that no fundamental law of physics would dictate that cumulative discoveries or production would follow a logistic curve in the future. 71 Unspoken but palpable were the political implications of the different positions of Hubbert and McKelvey. Although both were longtime registered Democrats, McKelvey's views reinforced a laissez-faire approach to business and a belief in a self-correcting market, while Hubbert envisioned an active, technocratic role for government in devising policies to conserve fossil fuels, which made it difficult for oilmen to embrace his ideas. McKelvey conformed to the post-New Deal retreat from regulation and became a consummate Washington insider. Hubbert, by contrast, remained a dissenting outsider whose environmental awareness was ahead of its time. Ironically, in 1964, just after his first big showdown with McKelvey, Hubbert retired from Shell Oil and went to work as a research geophysicist for the USGS. For the next thirteen years, he worked nominally under his chief antagonist. A strange career choice on the face of it, Hubbert had his reasons. He had reached the age of mandatory retirement at Shell (60 years). Despite McKelvey's presence, he still respected the USGS as an earth science research organization and, in the late 1950s, had received a standing offer to work there. Plus, he believed the USGS would allow him to continue working on openended problems. Employment at the USGS also allowed him reside in Washington, DC, near two organizations of which Hubbert took great pride in being a member: the National Academy of Sciences and the Cosmos Club, the private social club founded in 1878 by the famous geologist and explorer, John Wesley Powell, which was open only to people of distinction in science, literature, and the arts. Although always the iconoclast, Hubbert felt a strong need to belong and to be recognized by his peers.
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After joining the USGS, Hubbert continued to make predictions about oil and gas production and reserves, but the Survey published not a single one. In a now-famous 1967 paper for the AAPG, ''Degree of Advancement of Petroleum Exploration in the United States,'' he issued his most penetrating critique of the Zapp/McKelvey methodology, empirically demonstrating that oil historically was not discovered at a constant rate per unit drilling. Rather, oil production in the United States displayed decreasing returns per drilling effort over time. Hubbert showed that finding rates had declined sharply since the 1930s, as oil companies went after the easiest oil first, skimming the cream off the biggest and most productive fields in Texas, Oklahoma, and California. In 1972, as a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (AAAS), he helped kill McKelvey's nomination to both organizations by challenging the USGS director's ''scientific competence'' and ''intellectual integrity. '' 76 As domestic supply constraints tightened and the Arab oil embargo of 1973 magnified this predicament into a full-blown energy crisis, Hubbert followed his own star, granting interviews with the press and giving lectures that were interpreted by the USGS leadership as contradicting official policy or running down the Survey.
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In his confrontations with McKelvey and the USGS, Hubbert resorted to boundary work to establish his authority. 78 He presented his views as scientific and objective, in contrast to those of his adversaries, which he depicted as nonscientific and ideological. He regarded himself as a technocrat whose unbiased, scientific expertise gave him privileged insight into energy policy. However, his science rested on firmly held, some might say ideological, convictions about the material limits to economic growth. Although the McKelvey/Zapp assessment method may not have been as rigorously quantitative as Hubbert's, it was still based on scientific inquiry and remains part of the resource appraiser's toolkit. For all his concern about nontechnocratic influences over policymaking, Hubbert himself was not above playing politics. He policed the social and professional boundaries of science in Washington through the Cosmos Club, the NAS, and AAAS to solidify his position and marginalize McKelvey. Hubbert also was not shy about mentioning that he had the ear of Senator Henry M. ''Scoop'' Jackson, the powerful chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and leading presidential contender, as a veiled threat to anyone who might think of crossing him. 
Rose interview (ref. 32).
By the time McKelvey took the director's position, pressure had begun to build on the Survey for better justification of the vast gulf between its supply projections and Hubbert's. In 1969-70, for the first time in U.S. history, the reported amount of proved natural gas reserves plummeted. East Coast purchases of foreign fuel oil, now exempted from import quotas, soared. That winter, the coldest in thirty years, witnessed alarming fuel shortages. The following summer, capacity constraints on utilities caused brownouts in cities all along the Atlantic Coast. As the cost of foreign oil delivered to the United States caught up with the domestic wellhead price, imports began to surge, aided by loopholes in the oil quota system. 80 Dysfunctional regulations were one reason for the shortfalls, but many people began to think the crisis might also be caused by depleted reserves and a peak in production. In March 1972, the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC), the lead regulator of the oil industry, removed production limits, which encouraged oil producers to open the taps on their wells and produce at full capacity. The TRC's action was a sure sign that U.S. oil production was not keeping up with demand. Oil companies saw a day of reckoning not far on the horizon, and they began privately circulating statements that their own reserve numbers were far below those of the USGS. 81 Many industry geologists found they could not quarrel with Hubbert's method. Those who had in the past, such as Morgan Davis and Richard Gonzalez from Humble Oil, had retired. continental shelves. It estimated ultimate crude oil to be 170 billion barrels (240 billion including natural gas liquids) for the lower 48 states and 43 billion barrels for Alaska, totaling 213 billion barrels (252 billion including natural gas liquids).
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During the spring and summer of 1974, the reckoning arrived for the USGS. Annual crude oil production had declined each year since 1970. The inability of U.S. supply to respond to the crude oil price spike that followed the Arab oil embargo convinced many inside and outside the oil industry that the peak had past, just as Hubbert had predicted, and that the USGS figures for undiscovered crude oil were wildly inflated. For the first time, McKelvey hedged his bets. In testimony before Jackson's committee, he indicated a low range of 388 billion barrels and a high range of 608 billion barrels (including natural gas liquids), though the entire range was still significantly higher than Hubbert's. When the USGS published these numbers in a news release later that month, it met a tide of criticism. The most damaging rebuke came from John Moody, senior vice president for exploration and production at Mobil Oil, who called USGS estimates for the continental United States inconceivable, well above any figure his company could justify.
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This criticism forced the Survey to accelerate a thorough reevaluation of its method of estimating petroleum reserves and resources. In 1973, the Survey's Office of Energy Resources, under Thane McCullough, had reorganized its Oil and Gas Branch, installing Peter Rose, a former geologist with Shell Oil, as head. Rose began hiring geologists and researchers from various oil companies to bring the branch up to speed with methods being used by industry to assess oil and gas potential. These people were highly experienced in basin analysis, or play analysis. This involved looking at a prospective region from a petroleum geology perspective, examining the geothermal heat regime, the existence of organic-rich source rocks, the age of structural deformation, reservoir formations and seals, and other data. Using all this information, basin analysis then expressed the likelihood of a large oil and gas presence in a given play and what the range of reserves might be. USGS geologists did not have the data or knowledge of how to do this. 85 Just prior to the March 1974 Senate hearings, Rose and McCullough set up a special Resources Appraisal Group (RAG) to develop this kind of analysis and publish a new set of reserve estimates by June 1975. RAG involved more than seventy regional specialists and analyzed more than a hundred possible petroleum provinces. Using methods of province-by-province geologic evaluation, RAG produced a range of estimates with assigned probabilities. Published as USGS Circular 725, the RAG numbers ranged between 218 and 295 billion barrels of ultimate reserves. 86 These were still higher than Hubbert's and arrived at using a different methodology, but they were much closer to his than to those of the USGS, and more in line with other estimates being made at the time. Circular 725 was significant in that it marked the end of a fourteen-year period during which the USGS estimates had been at least two or three times higher than this.
Although McKelvey still tried to subvert the acceptance of Circular 725 as the agency's official position, the walls began to close in around him. 87 In 1974, the former Interior Secretary (1961-69) Stewart Udall co-authored a book called The Energy Balloon, which employed an apt metaphor for the Survey's inflated petroleum estimates. ''I had been assured again and again by Interior's experts that there was plenty of domestic oil to take care of our needs at least until the year 2000,'' Udall wrote in the book's foreword. After he left office, it became clear to him ''that an enormous energy balloon of inflated promises and boundless optimism had long since lost touch with any mainland reality.'' 88 The next year, Udall said that if he were interior secretary, ''the first thing I would do would be to kick McKelvey out. '' 89 In 1975, the NAS-NRC's Committee on Mineral Resources and the Environment (COMRATE) published a study that was milder than Udall in its criticism of USGS's petroleum assessment, but which rebuked the Survey for relying on little more than guesses. Chaired by Yale University geophysicist, Brian Skinner, COMRATE was the first to characterize the debate as one between the Cassandras, who ''pay too little attention to the adjustment potential of the market mechanism and generally fail to understand the distinction between 'reserves' and 'resources,''' and the Cornucopians, who ''rely too heavily on the market mechanism for inducing the transformation of 'infinite' resources into almost infinite reserves, and on the technological miracle for providing the physical wherewithal.'' The study bemoaned the data deficiencies, divergent methodologies, and ''definitional vagueness'' that plagued petroleum resource assessment. Yet it concluded unequivocally that the ''undiscovered recoverable resources of oil and natural gas, onshore and offshore, in the United States, including Alaska, are considerably smaller than indicated by figures currently accepted in government circles. '' 90 The COMRATE report marked the end of a long period of boundless optimism about U.S. petroleum supplies. In the summer of 1977, newly elected president Jimmy Carter and his Interior Secretary, Cecil Andrus, forced Vincent McKelvey, the symbol of this optimism, to resign as USGS director, the first time this had happened in the Survey's ninety-eight-year history. On his way out of the director's office, McKelvey received one last bit of recognition for his service: in 1978, the U.S. Board on Geographic Names named a peak in the Thiel Mountains of Antarctica after him. Mount McKelvey, however, stood in the long shadow cast by Hubbert's Peak. 92 This may help explain the cultural endurance and popularity of Hubbert, even in the face of mounting evidence against the peak oil thesis.
Estimates of petroleum supply inform official thinking about energy policy. Although some Washington insiders denied the importance of USGS's petroleum estimates to policymaking, the Survey's optimistic estimates under McKelvey at the very least obscured the need for rethinking assumptions about domestic oil abundance that shaped policy choices. 93 Better planning and conservation measures would not have prevented growing dependence on foreign oil, but, as the COMRATE report pointed out, the lack of such measures resulting from overconfident assurances of abundance helped speed the depletion of domestic U.S. petroleum resources.
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The debate over Peak Oil never moved far beyond policymaking into academic earth sciences, 95 but it did resonate in the wider official and public Resource estimation was an aspect of exploration geology and geophysics. These were applied fields in the oil and gas industry, where proprietary data was generated. Advances in theoretical and applied geophysics tended to come out of the geophysical laboratories of the major oil companies. With the acceptance of theory of plate tectonics in the 1960s, geophysics achieved greater penetration into academic geosciences. At the same time, contact between the oil industry and academia increased, largely through the patronage of oil industry contractors in funding geophysical laboratories at places like the Colorado School of Mines and Stanford University. In 1954, Henri Salvatori, the founder of Western Geophysical, an industry seismic contractor, donated funds to build a geophysical laboratory at Stanford. In 1961, Cecil Green, founder of Geophysical Services, Inc., the other leading seismic contractor, subsidized a new geophysical lab at the Colorado School of Mines. Hubbert himself helped create an environmental studies program at Stanford in the early 1960s, but natural resource evaluation was not part of the curriculum. Not until the late 1970s did curricula addressing subjects such as basin realms from the 1970s forward. Hubbert helped to restore credibility to arguments that asserted the finitude of oil resources and called for greater conservation, efficiency, and planning in the use of energy. By the mid-1970s, his was no longer a lone voice warning about petroleum exhaustion. From the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth (1972) the U.S. Forest Service led to the use of flawed data to conjure the illusion of timber cornucopia, allowing rapid depletion of timber reserves and damage to forest ecosystems. In the case of U.S. and international fisheries management, as Carmel Finley argues, the highly permissive policy of ''maximum sustainable yield'' gave rise to an industrial fishing system with the capacity for exploitation that far exceeded the ability of fish stocks to reproduce. 99 The sudden realization of peak oil production in the United States seemed to confirm the notion of ''future shock,'' the title of futurologist Alan Toffler's 1970 bestseller, which sensationally described ''the shattering stress and disorientation that we induce in individuals by subjecting them to too much change in too short a time.'' 100 According to one new history of the future, Toffler's brand of futurology was a radical break with previous imaginings of future modernity and progress, reflecting the ''growing unease and fear in a period in which the future became laden with connotations of looming disasters such as ecocide, atomic war, and the population bomb. '' 101 The apprehension about the future in the 1970s gave rise to the phenomenon of futurology. From scenario planning and forecasting, to the growth in futures markets (in oil, incidentally, for the first time), to the new popularity of astrology, to religious predictions of the apocalypse, such as Hal Lindsey's The Late, Great Planet Earth, ''people became extraordinarily focused on the future.'' 102 Secular prophecies like Paul Ehrlich's The Population Bomb (1968) and the Club of Rome's Limits to Growth contributed to the obsession with the future by warning of impending food and resource shortages. Although these warnings turned out to be overly alarmist, the one secular prophecy that actually did come true was Hubbert's prediction of peak oil in the United States, which made him a folk hero among conservationists who feared the impending exhaustion of resources in a high-growth society.
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Hubbert's prophecy created a unique and lasting legacy. In the 1990s, his followers, led by former oil industry geologist Colin Campbell, began issuing predictions about an impending peak in world oil production. In 2000, Campbell organized the Association for the Study of Peak Oil (ASPO), which drew together a diverse assortment of people, ranging from geologists and hobbyists who specialized in reserve estimations, to industry partisans looking for tax and regulatory breaks, to anti-oil environmentalists, to advocates for population control, to miscellaneous doomsayers and futurologists who fantasized about the decay and obliteration of the petroleum-dependent aspects of modern life. ASPO found a larger audience when skyrocketing oil prices during the first decade of the twenty-first century convinced many people that the peak was near or had even past.
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The peak oil movement reached critical mass in 2005, when Hubbert's former colleague at the Shell Bellaire lab, Kennneth Deffeyes, popularized a linear regression technique, sometimes called Hubbert Linearization, that graphed the ratio of annual global oil production to cumulative production in order to estimate ultimate reserves and the moment of peak production (Fig. 4) . Deffeyes mischievously predicted this moment to arrive on Thanksgiving Day of that year. 105 At the same time, global peak oil prophecies gained official credibility with the publication of a report commissioned by the U.S. Department of Energy called Peaking of World Oil Production: Impacts, Mitigation, and Risk Management (also know as the Hirsch Report after its lead author, Robert L. Hirsch).
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Peak oil spawned a subculture of true believers. Matthew SchneiderMayerson calculates that during the 2000s ''over one hundred thousand Americans came to believe that oil scarcity would lead to the imminent collapse of industrial society and the demise of the United States of America.'' Most of them were upper middle-class, middle-aged white men with a profound ''sense of political alienation and a bleak evaluation of contemporary environmental politics.'' 107 They churned out books, websites, blogs, podcasts, YouTube channels, novels, poems, cartoons, video games, and documentary films warning of the unhappy fate that awaited the world. All paid homage to the peak oil prophet, King Hubbert. One could even find bumper stickers and T-shirts emblazoned with the slogan ''All Hail King Hubbert'' (Fig. 5) . Despairing of the futility of political action, many Peak Oilers retreated to bunkering food and supplies in preparation for the impending energy famine. Peak oil became yet another strain in the long American tradition of prophecy belief, which after 1970, according to cultural historian Paul Boyer, ''unquestionably intensified'' and ''filtered into secular mass culture. '' 108 In recent years the more radical Hubbertians have earned a reputation as the liberal equivalent of the born-again Christian fans of the ''Left Behind'' novels. Although Hubbert deserves credit for helping to professionalize the field of petroleum resource estimation, the methods he pioneered have remained controversial and not widely accepted by other practitioners. The 1970s reforms in the USGS Oil and Gas Branch moved federal resource assessment in a different direction. Government scientists came to rely on multiple techniques for assessing undiscovered conventional oil and gas reserves, using probabilistic methods rather than deterministic, single-value ones, like those favored by Hubbert and McKelvey. They deployed analytical innovations such as discovery process models, which empirically characterize the relationship between drilling and discoveries. Geological research on regions, provinces, and petroleum systems also informed assessments, which introduced separate categories for conventional oil and gas, reserve growth in existing fields, and unconventional (mainly shale and oil sands) resources.
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One obvious weakness of the Hubbert model was that it did not account for the influence of oil imports in the early 1970s. The fact that oil imported from abroad was available at the same or lower cost than domestic oil caused domestic production to peak and decline faster than it would have without the replacement. Barring imports, the production curve probably would have looked more like a long plateau instead of a sharp peak. 111 As Edward Porter of the API later noted, the accuracy of Hubbert's prediction for U.S. oil could be seen ''as a lucky coincidence, similar to that of a broken clock that tells the right time twice a day. '' 112 A growing body of literature has shown that Hubbert's curve-fitting and extrapolation techniques suffer from many statistical and conceptual problems. Different functional models often fit the same data but give widely varying estimates of ultimate reserves. The techniques cannot predict future cycles of discovery and production and do not account well for oilfield growth over time-that is, the tendency of oil discoveries to grow in size with delineation drilling. Results are highly sensitive to the length of the data series. Over time, Hubbert linearization has tended to underestimate ultimate production for many fields and regions. Hubbert's techniques, which rely on aggregate data, work well only under special conditions-in geologically homogenous regions with few restrictions on exploration and a long history of production. This does not describe most places around the world. For less-explored regions, volumetric yield analysis is still used in combination with other methods for estimating ultimate reserves. Finally, many studies have shown that Hubbert's methods neglect future changes in prices and technology, just as McKelvey and others had long asserted. All these weaknesses combine to produce overly pessimistic oil supply forecasts.
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Oil and gas production trends have increasingly validated these criticisms. Hubbert's 1962 prediction about the U.S. natural gas production peak (circa 1975) and his most optimistic 1974 prediction about the world oil production peak (circa 2000) are increasingly distant from the actual peaks, whenever they come. Neither has peaked yet. Moreover, deepwater discoveries and recent breakthroughs in exploiting unconventional sources of oil and gas have recently increased production of both. Since 2005-the year of Deffeyes's peak oil prediction-hydrofractured drilling has unlocked oil from tight sandstone formations, reversing the historical decline of domestic U.S. oil production. 114 Hubbert's reputation for clairvoyance is fading. Recent estimates of conventional oil reserves are neither as optimistic as those of the USGS under McKelvey nor as pessimistic as the Peak Oilers'. In 2000, the USGS boosted its estimates of ultimate conventional reserves to a mean 3.01 trillion barrels worldwide-the United States portion accounting for a mean 362 billion barrels-enough to continue with current rates of production for fifty to a hundred years. These estimates were far higher than the 230 billion barrels for the United States and 2 trillion barrels predicted by ASPO. By the end of the decade, the U.S. numbers were well above Hubbert's prediction. Cumulative U.S. production of crude oil and lease condensate had reached 202 billion barrels, close to Hubbert's estimate of ultimate reserves, while the Energy Information Administration (EIA) and USGS predicted in 2012 that the nation still has another mean 220 billion barrels of technically recoverable proven and unproven reserves. 115 As convincing as Hubbert's Peak appeared to be during the twin energy and environmental crises in the 1970s, it still did not quash American faith in resource abundance. In 1980, at the height of the second oil price shock, University of Illinois economist Julian Simon made a famous thousanddollar bet with Paul Ehrlich over whether the prices of chromium, copper, nickel, tin, and tungsten would rise or fall during the decade of the 1980s. Ehrlich, famous for his warnings about population pressures on natural resources, believed that rising metals prices would confirm his pessimism. Simon, an outspoken critic of Malthusian warnings about overpopulation, wagered that markets and technology would reverse the steep rise in raw materials prices. Following the oil and commodities price collapse of the 1980s, Simon won the bet easily. 116 Simon the ''Doomslayer'' became a Cornucopian hero. In 1998, just before his death, he published a revised version of his 1981 treatise, The Ultimate Resource. In the new edition, Simon expounded on the nonfiniteness of oil and the unwarranted pessimism of official supply forecasts. He even lamented what he considered the unfair treatment Vincent McKelvey had received by the Carter White House. In Simon's view, if society would only allow the ''ultimate resource,'' human ingenuity, to perform its magic on the ''master resource,'' which was energy, the world would never have to worry about an energy shortage. Around the same time, organizations such as the API and Daniel Yergin's think-tank, Cambridge Energy Research Associates (CERA), turned to debunking the new wave of peak oil theories. Simmons, who expected the peaking of global oil production to more than triple the price of oil, gladly accepted. When the annual average price of crude oil closed at $90/barrel at the end of 2010, another prophecy of doom fell. 118 In the years since, booming hydrocarbon production from deepwater, shale, and tight sandstone formations appears to have further vindicated the Peak Oil skeptics, spurring celebration for a new age of petroleum cornucopia. 119 Peak Oilers responded to mounting evidence against their theories with qualifications and denials. They moved their day of reckoning further into the future. They insisted that oil from shale and deepwater oil were not part of Hubbert's original analysis of U.S. domestic production. They distinguished between the peak in conventional versus unconventional fossil fuels, the peak in ''easy'' versus ''hard'' oil, and the peak in OPEC versus non-OPEC oil. 120 Some shifted the focus to declining ''energy return on investment'' (EROI) as a harbinger of dwindling conventional oil supply. 121 Others even ridiculed the oil and gas fracking boom as a Ponzi scheme that at best would provide ''a temporary reprieve from having to deal with real problems.'' 122 In general, Peak Oilers refused to accept the central insight passed on from Zimmerman to McKelvey to Simon to Yergin, which is that changes in price and technology push oil exploration into new geological frontiers, convert probable reserves into proven reserves, and turn unconventional oil into conventional oil.
No matter how innovative the model, robust the forecasting tool, or scientific the analysis, predictions about trends or events in the future are often inaccurate, and usually by a large margin of error. 123 In the original debate about the end of oil, King Hubbert and Vincent McKelvey allowed their personal animosity and doctrinaire positions to keep them from acknowledging uncertainty in their claims about the future. Hubbert insisted that oil resources could be defined entirely in physical terms, and that their supply could be expressed with accuracy in a neat mathematical formula, while McKelvey denied that resources could be constrained by physical factors. Neither man's expertise was sufficient to handle the complex problems of resource estimation with the kind of confidence they expressed.
124 Their -successors continue to assert confidently that they have divined the future of oil, which only ensures that energy policy debates remain hopelessly polarized. Publicity stunts such as bets on short-term movements in resource prices further contribute to such polarization. Resource estimation may be more sophisticated than ever before, but there is still massive uncertainty about future petroleum supply-not to mention, demand-and how difficult and costly it will be to develop. Scarcity and abundance have always existed in a dynamic relationship, shaped by many physical and social variables. For now, the pendulum seems to have swung back toward accepting abundance, but with new implications. For years, the concept of peak oil was important to many environmentalists' vision of the future. Some environmental leaders, however, are now beginning to reframe the problem, accepting the world's large endowment of fossil fuels, but warning of the disastrous implications of the increased burning of the earth's carbon budget for the global climate.
125 Just as Cornucopians insist on a flexible definition of what a resource is, environmentalists have redefined the meaning of scarcity and abundance to include the degradation of ecosystem resources-water quality, biodiversity, climate stability-resulting from the intensive production and consumption of fossil fuels.
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King Hubbert never envisioned the oil age ending as a result of too much oil. Were he alive today, he may defend his method and reject the new assurances of petroleum abundance, just as his followers do. But as a public intellectual concerned with how to value natural resources across generations, and as an environmentalist who believed that relentless economic growth could as easily impoverish as enrich society, today's Hubbert may be willing to rethink the problem of oil. From our current vantage point, the future could easily bear out the famous words of former Saudi Arabian oil minister, Shiekh Zaki Yamani: ''The Stone Age came to an end, not because we had a lack of stones, and the oil age will end not because we have a lack of oil.'' 
